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Abstract 
Cloud Computing  has become very common in our daily life. Cloud computing 
has emerged with promises to decrease the cost of computing implementation and deliver the 
computing as service, where the clients pay only  for what he needed and used. However, due 
to the new structure of the cloud computing model, several security concerns have been raised 
and many other security threats have been needed to be reevaluated according to the cloud 
structure. Besides, the traditional security risk assessment methods become unfit for cloud 
computing model due to its new distinguished characteristics. In this paper, we analysis the 
ability to assess the security risks in 
cloud computing environments.  
Keywords. Security Risk assessment; Cloud Computing; Security Risk assessment in 
Cloud Computing 
1. Introduction  
Since cloud computing terminology introduced by Google CEO, Eric Schmidt in 
2006 [1], many research efforts have been conducted. The terminology and its 
related technology have improved rapidly from its introductory phase. The basic 
idea of cloud computing is to deliver the computing resources as utility,  just like the 
electric power; where the end-user has not to worry about how or where these 
resources are created or managed. It is the same concept, but with information 
technologies where computing (i.e. processing, storage, data, and software 
resources) delivering as utility; in which the providers will deliver the computing 
service on-demand and the consumers will pay based on usage [2]. Despite, in 
todays, the term cloud computing is more popular with cloud computing storage; the 
cloud computing model will be the most spread computing model in the next few 
decades. 
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According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the 
important characteristics of cloud computing include on-demand self-service, broad 
network access, resources pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service. There are 
three main service models; first, software as a service (SaaS), in which the consumer 
has capability only to use and control the application and its configuration. Second, 
platform as a service (PaaS) in which the consumer can control the hosting 
environments. Finally, infrastructure as a service (IaaS) in which the consumer has 
the capability to control everything except the data center infrastructure. In addition, 
there are four main deployment models: public clouds, private clouds, community 
clouds, and hybrid clouds [3]. 
managers to immigrate to the cloud computing environments. Kim Mays predicted 
that Small and Midsize Business (SMB) have or are considering adopting some sort 
of cloud computing technology; according to the surveys, 61 percent of SMBs are 
using cloud-based technologies [4]. Moreover, an IDC report says that  three out of  
ten midsize organizations will adopt public cloud solutions [4].  
Information is one of the most organizations  important assets; thus, assessing the 
information security risk is vital for the organizations. Information security risk 
assessment is important because the data confidentiality, integrity and availability 
could be compromised if it disclosed for unauthorized person, or modified wrongly 
or may be destroyed. Cloud computing raises many security risks that must be 
clearly addressed and assessed before moving our valuable data to the cloud 
computing environment. Failure to do may lead to lose the data confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability, which may cause a serious damage to the organization's 
information assets.  
It is essential  that every organization must have a sound risk management process 
within their business life cycle. The objective of the risk management is to reduce 
the risk to an acceptable level. The information security risk can be defined as 
potential that a threat will exploit a vulnerability of an asset or group of assets and 
thereby cause harm to the organization [5]. A proper risk management process 
should ensure that the suitable security controls have been used to ascertain that the 
organization can perform its mission [6]. There is no one can guarantee hundred 
percent of the security of information systems; however, the efficient and effective 
information security risk assessment method can provide high-level of security 
confidence [7].  
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There are many of the information security risk assessment methods, standards and 
regulations such as NIST SP800-30, ISO 27005 and  AS/NZS 4360. They are 
released by governmental and private organizations such as the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the International Organization for 
standardization (ISO). Despite, there is a similarity between these standards in the 
main steps of risk management, and there are many differences in details, phases 
and supporting guidelines. We can summarize the main steps of the security risk 
management as follows; context establishment, risk assessment, risk treatment, and 
risk monitoring and review. Nevertheless, most of the traditional risk assessment 
governed by the organization 
itself and that all security management processes are imposed by the organization. 
These assumptions may do not apply to cloud computing environments. 
In fact, there are some main differences between cloud computing environments and 
conventional computing environment. These major differences make the traditional 
risk assessment methods are unfit for cloud computing environments. In this paper, 
we analyzed the ability of the traditional information security risk assessment 
we analyzed the cloud computing security threats according to the cloud computing 
distinguished characteristics. Besides, we reviewed some of the existing risk 
assessment approaches that have been used with cloud computing.  
 This paper is organized as follows; the next section discusses the security threats 
that accompany the cloud computing model. Section three introduces some of the 
literature review of the current methods that used for risk assessment in cloud 
computing. Then, section four discusses why the current risk assessment is unfit for 
cloud computing, and the last section is the conclusion. 
2. Cloud Computing Security  
NIST in its definition for cloud  computing [3] mentioned five key features; 
resource pooling, broad network access, on-demand self-service, rapid elasticity, 
and measured service. These five key features of the cloud computing model 
distinguish the cloud environment from the traditional environment. Nevertheless, 
many security concerns accompany these characteristics or the technologies that 
used to guarantee provision of these characteristics. In this section, we discuss these 
information security threats that make the traditional risk assessment methodologies 
are unfit to be used in cloud computing environments.   
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Resource pooling: Resource pooling means that multiple clients share the resources 
(i.e. Processing, storage, etc...) of the same physical cloud infrastructure; they get 
their resource needs from the resource pool and release them when they finished. 
The Cloud Clients (CCs) will use the resources that offered by the Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP) to manage and process their own assets (i.e. Data), which means 
involving of different stakeholders within the process. At this point, we want to 
focus on these two concepts and their security problems; multi-tenancy and multi-
stakeholders.   
Multi-tenancy is the situation where an application runs on the CSP's server and 
serves the multi-client, with keeping all their data isolated [8]. However, the tenant's 
data will be located in the same physical memory with other tenants' data at the 
same time. This situation is very risky; it can cause a serious vulnerability for the 
confidentiality and privacy of the tenants' data. The main security concern is how 
the CSP can guarantee the isolation of the tenants' data. Thereby, the research efforts 
have different forms; some are focusing on how the re-engineering of SaaS 
application can extend the application capabilities to isolate the tenants' data, such as 
[9, 10]; while some others are focusing on how to isolate the tenants' data during its 
processing, rest and transition such as [11, 12] and the developing of the security 
controls with considering the multi-tenancy problem is also another form such as 
[14, 15]. The current research efforts are more about tenant oriented security than 
service oriented security, such as [13]. 
Multi-Stakeholders: In conventional information systems, there is one or more of the 
stakeholders, but in the cloud computing model, there are at least two stockholders 
(i.e. CSP and CC). This fact will affect on some security factors such as the trust 
between stakeholders, the compliance regulations, the decisions of the security 
management process, and the security tasks and responsibilities. 
Asset s owner: Some security standards distinguish between 'asset ownership' and 
'asset property'. The asset owner may not have the property rights to the asset, but he 
has the responsibility to produce, develop, maintain and use the asset [14]. In cloud 
computing, data as asset is maintained by the CSP but it is produced by the CC who 
has the property rights for the data asset. The CC is the only one who knows the 
value of the data and its lawfulness. Moreover, in cloud computing, we need to 
distinguish between two types of assets; the hardware assets and software assets. 
The hardware assets are owned and controlled by the CSP, but the software assets 
(i.e. applications and data) may be owned by the CSP or the CCs. The client's 
software assets (i.e. data) are under the client's property rights, but it is existed on 
the CSP  hardware. 
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Broad Network Access: the cloud computing service must be accessible by any 
network-based appliance such as desktop, laptop, smart-phone and tablet device. 
These devices can be less processing power, because the processing load will be on 
the CSP infrastructure. Usually, the CCs' devices use the web browsers to access to 
the service available on the network. In case of cloud computing, sometimes the 
CC's devices need to support more specialized software to deal with the virtual 
services. However, the cloud dependence on the network as mean of access will 
bring the network security concerns to the cloud computing environments.  
Moreover, the concept of system boundaries will change in cloud computing 
environments. It is important to define the system boundaries are to ensure that all 
relevant assets are included during the risk assessment process. According to 
ISO27005, the scope and boundaries can be defined by defining the origination's 
constraints. In cloud computing, some constraints can be specified by the CSP such 
as the technical and infrastructural constraints, and others can be defined by the CCs 
such as legislative and regulatory constraints. In the traditional information system, 
the network devices and firewalls are used to define a clear boundary for the inside 
environment and monitor the outside access the system. However, this is not 
applicable for cloud computing environment since it totally depends on the network 
as an essential mean of access, and the main form of access is the remote access.   
Besides, the cloud computing model inherits the Internet security threats; this is 
normal since the Internet is usually used to deliver the cloud computing services. As 
a result, the phishing, data loss, password weaknesses, botnets running on the client 
devices and username brute forcers are some examples of well-known Internet 
threats that will accompany the cloud computing [15]. 
On-demand self-service: On-demand self-service means the cloud computing 
service is always available for the clients. Moreover, the cloud computing service 
must be modifiable by the consumers with minimum interaction from the provider. 
The availability is one of the most important security requirements. Some clients 
need to be available all the time, so they select the cloud model to guarantee 
unlimited resources that support their availability. However, the sharing of resources 
between the clients may lead to exhaust the resources which may cause a critical 
problem for some clients. The CSP should ensure that the clients will get enough 
resources whenever they need, as the unplanned downtime may cause high 
economic impacts. Moreover, the availability of the system may be affected by a 
security breach; the system must be able to continue operation even the security 
breach occurs [16].  
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Rapid elasticity: Rapid elasticity means that cloud computing provider may at least 
semi-automatically (i.e. near real-time) to handle the sudden increase or decrease of 
usage. The CSP must be able to expand or reduce allocated resources according to 
the consumers' requirements. This operation might be done automatically, quickly 
and efficiently [17]. Many problems may arise with this situation, such as data 
remanence and virtualization security problems.  
Data Remanence: The security concern is when the tenant scales down and releases 
some of the resources; these resources will be relocated for another tenant. The 
attacker may apply for a large amount of storage and start trying to retrieve the data. 
The cloud computing provider must make sure that the pervious tenant data is 
securely erased before reallocate the resources to another tenant.  
Virtualization is enabling the providers to use one single physical resource (i.e. 
Server, storage, and network) as multiple virtual machines. Virtualization is not the 
cloud computing, but it is enabled the cloud computing to be more flexible and 
scalable. Occasionally, cloud computing can be existed without virtualization for 
many reasons such as seeking more performance [18]. However, most of the cloud 
computing projects are built with virtualization technology. Hypervisor or virtual 
machine manager (VMM) is a program that manages all the virtualization functions 
and allows multiple operating systems to share a single hardware host. It can be 
installed directly on the hardware such as Microsoft Hyper-V, Oracle VM, VMware 
ESX, and IBM z/VM. Alternatively, it may be running on the host operating system 
such as Oracle VirtualBox, Parallels, Virtual PC, VMware Fusion, and VMware 
Server.  
There are many security concerns for using virtualization in cloud computing. The 
potential that the hypervisor may be compromised, and this may have a bad impact 
on all host VMs. This risk makes the virtualization implementation one of the 
importance of security concern in cloud computing [19]. In addition, the 
implementations of virtualization must make sure that the physical media is cleared 
before it can be relocated for another tenant. Moreover, the network attacks that 
come from the other VMs on the same physical server may be hard to detect. Thus, 
the traffic of the VMs must be monitored. The configuration of network switches 
and routers must be checked and maybe reset before relocating the resource for the 
new tenant. 
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3. Security Risk Assessment in Cloud Computing 
The cloud computing model has certain unique characteristics and uses techniques 
that have raised several new risks and the need to reevaluate and redefine many 
well-defined past risks according to the cloud computing model [16]. Extensive 
research efforts were focused on defining cloud computing risks. Analyst firm 
Gartner published in 2008, a report on cloud computing, where it warned customers 
to select their cloud computing provider very carefully and to consider seven 
specific security issues: privileged user access, regulatory compliance, data location, 
data segregation, recovery, investigative support, and long-term viability [20]. 
Based on previous studies, [21] thirty-two risks were identified, some new, some 
pre-existing. Some studies on cloud computing assessed the security risks from the 
twenty-three risks [22]. ENISA published its own 
report on cloud computing security risks, which estimated risk levels based on the 
ISO/IEC 27005 standard, which were depending on risk probability and risk impact. 
The ENISA report lists thirty-five risks, which were organized into three categories: 
policy and organizational risks, technical risks, and legal risks [23].  
Many researchers have proposed risk assessment methods in the cloud computing 
environment. Some of these studies focused on specific security problems, such as 
insider attacks, virtualization threats [24-27], data transmission with cloud 
computing [28] service-level agreement (SLA) [29, 30], anti virus in the cloud 
service [31], denial of service attacks in the cloud [32] and identity management 
[33]. In addition, frameworks which are used to assess security risks in cloud 
computing environments as a whole process have also been proposed. Those 
proposals varied based on their study perspectives. Some studies proposed 
frameworks that can be used by the CCs and even suggested transferring some risks 
to the CSP or to a trusted third party.  
Assessing the security risk from the client  perspective only, such as [21, 22]  is 
overlooking the fact that the CSP owns and manages the infrastructure of the cloud 
environment. On the other hand, assessing the security risks from the service 
provider perspective only, such as [34-36] is underestimated the importance of 
involving the CCs in the risk assessment process. The CC opinion must be 
considered because they know how data security violations can affect them. Still, 
the CC cannot be involved in the whole risk management process because the 
process becomes very complicated as the number of CCs increases. CC participation 
must be at the minimum level and only to evaluate the necessary factors that affect 
the risk assessment results. In cloud computing, the physical infrastructure and 
sometimes the software used to process the data are owned by the CSP, whereas the 
Sameer Hasan Albakri et. al. /IRICT (2014) 483-495 490 
 
data are owned by the CC, who alone knows the real consequences of losing data 
security. Thus, assessing the security risk from one side only leads to inaccurate risk 
evaluation. An ideal risk assessment methodology must be capable of considering 
s without involving the client in all steps of the risk 
assessment process to minimize complexity. 
4.  Traditional Risk Assessment Problem 
It is a fact that there is no computing model is hundred percent secure [37]; even 
though, many information security standards have been developed to secure the 
information in the traditional computing models. These security standards 
guaranteed an acceptable level of information security and gave an evidence that the 
best practice of information security has been used. NIST guidelines (SP 800-30, SP 
800-39, SP 800-53), ISO 27000 family of standards, AS/NZS 4360, and AS/NZS 
ISO 31000:2009 are examples of these security standards.  
Actually, most of these risk assessment standards a
organization itself, and that security management processes are determined by the 
organization itself [38, 39]. However, the characteristics of the cloud computing 
model invalidate this assumption in the case of a cloud computing model [16]; cloud 
computing has many differences that make these standards unfit for cloud 
computing environments. CSP will not be able to rely on the traditional risk 
assessment methods since the cloud computing environments are different from the 
traditional computing environments; the traditional risk calculation will be 
inaccurate in cloud computing environments.  
On the other hand, the CC will not be able to assess the security risks of CSP 
system; CSP will not provide extensive details of its security system to hinder 
hackers who may be pretending as clients.  Even though, the CSP must provide CCs 
enough confidences that he has a sound risk-assessment process and guarantees the 
 
Moreover, risk is defined as the probability of occurrence of a security breach 
multiplied by the consequence of occurrence of a security breach [14, 40-43]. The 
difficulty to apply this formula in cloud computing comes from the difficulty to 
calculate the risk impact and risk likelihood. The most popular way to calculate the 
value of risk impact is by assessing the possible loss if the security threat occurs. 
However, in cloud computing, CSP will not be able to assess the value of the 
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possible loss, because he does not know the real value of the assets (i.e. Data). 
Which may differ from client to client, only the client himself, who know the actual 
value of the assets (i.e. data) and as a result the cost of its loose or breach.  
Accordingly, let us assume for a moment that the CSP will ask the CC to provide 
their assessments of the risk impact or the cost of the consequences of losing the 
assets (i.e. data). Every single client will have his own assessment of his assets (i.e. 
data); these assessments will vary as the number of clients increased, and it will be a 
hard task to normalize these assessments to a specific range. Moreover, using a 
predefine scale, such as 1 to 5 or 1 to 10, may also result inaccurate assessments. If 
we do not have any equivalent monetary value of scale values, it will confuse the 
clients. On the other hand, it is difficult to define an equivalent monetary value for 
 
Even if we assumed there are no values out of the predefined range, the real problem 
assess the consequences of losing their data or assessing the consequences for their 
data breach, unless they experience that in the past. For example, if the CSP has an 
email system, the cloud client for this service can be a child at primary school or a 
manager at a big company. The email contains possibly worth nothing or maybe 
worth millions of dollars; it may be about a math homework or about important 
secrets that can cause a serious loss for the company if it is compromised. Both 
clients may give their email importance nine of ten on the consequence of lose scale.  
Moreover, for some reasons, the probability of the risk, it is getting more difficult to 
be assessed in cloud computing environment; first, the users of the cloud computing 
systems are mobile users or external users [44]. Second, the CCs are accessing the 
system over the Internet, which is an open environment [45]. Third, the distinct 
clients will have distinct areness. Fourth, there is a great 
potential that the risk is coming from the client himself.  
Furthermore, Samy et al. research shows that traditional information security risk 
analysis methods have many weaknesses [46]. It is not able to identify various types 
of information security concurrency threats [47]. Besides, it is more focused on 
technology rather than emphasis on the people and process aspects of information 
systems. It has required a lot of time and has a higher cost, especially with medium 
to large organizations. Moreover, the centric approach in conducting risk assessment 
that used with the traditional method is not helping the users and field managers to 
improve their security awareness [46].  
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In brief, the traditional way to calculate the risk might have inaccurate results with 
cloud computing environments and also difficult to be used. Thus, we need a 
different methodology to assess the risk in the cloud computing environment. The 
suggested method must be able to consider both service provider and client and 
come out with accurate results. According to Kim et al., the security risk analysis 
method must guarantee provision of two advantages, effective monitoring of 
information security policies and appropriate information for the future prediction 
for information security risks [48]. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the usability of the traditional security risk assessment 
methods in cloud computing environments. The characteristics of the cloud 
computing model make the traditional risk assessment methods are unfit for cloud 
computing environments. The security risk assessment method in cloud computing 
should be able to consider both cloud service provider and cloud client during the 
risk assessment process; moreover, it should be able to assess the security risk with 
without depending on the traditional measurements. In our future work, we will 
propose security risk assessment for cloud computing environment. 
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